[Mova](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/) · [this page in HTML](https://mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/Not-a-Big-Brother/) [home](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/) / [docs](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/) / [licence](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/) / Not a Big Brother # Not a Big Brother Appendix to the Elamur Cosmic License and the Elamur API Terms Working policy text — English draft Version: 2026-10-15 (re-scoped from Mova Extended, which is postponed) ## Purpose The Elamur API is not intended to become a toolkit for population control. **Scope (2026-10-15).** The code is open, but not for Big Brother. Free Elamur repositories (`mova-free` and others) move to the **Elamur Cosmic License** (`ELAMUR-COSMIC-LICENSE.md`): the most open license we can write — anything, for anyone, no attribution, no fees — with only the restrictions of this appendix built in and passed on to every copy. The hosted API and tokens carry the same restrictions in [Elamur API and Token Terms — working draft](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/API-TERMS/). Mova Extended is postponed; Elamur sells nothing but API access and tokens. This appendix explains the policy logic behind restrictions on certain government, security, intelligence, and state-controlled uses of the Elamur API. It is explanatory policy text. The operative legal terms should remain in the license and its formal annexes. The core principle is simple: > Powerful language, search, analytical, and automation systems should not be used to turn entire populations into targets of political control. ## What this appendix is not This document is not: - a ranking of peoples; - a punishment based on nationality; - a generic democracy index; - a ban on ordinary users from particular countries; - a claim that only authoritarian states conduct surveillance; - a substitute for precise legal language. The concern is institutional conduct and prohibited use, not citizenship. A student, researcher, journalist, dissident, developer, civil-society organization, or ordinary user should not be prohibited merely because they live in or come from a restricted jurisdiction. ## The distinction between capability and abuse Many states possess powerful surveillance capabilities. That fact alone is not enough to place a country in the restricted-jurisdiction annex. The relevant questions are: - What is the system used for? - Who is being monitored? - Is political speech treated as a threat? - Is the surveillance targeted, lawful, necessary, and proportionate? - Is there meaningful judicial and political oversight? - Can abuse be challenged? - Are journalists and civil-society groups able to investigate the state? - Can citizens criticize the government without becoming targets? - Is technology used to identify, profile, censor, intimidate, imprison, disappear, or otherwise persecute people for political reasons? The difference is therefore not simply technical capacity. It is the relationship between surveillance power, political coercion, accountability, and human rights. ## Repressive Big Brother The working highest-risk classification is: - China - North Korea - Iran - Russia - Saudi Arabia - Belarus - United Arab Emirates These jurisdictions are treated as especially sensitive because the working policy analysis identifies a combination of: - extensive state surveillance capability; - censorship and information control; - monitoring of political expression; - identification or targeting of dissidents; - weak or ineffective avenues for independent redress; - state security structures with a serious risk of using analytical systems for political coercion. Vietnam is currently treated as a closely related but separate category: - `high_censorship_and_surveillance` This classification may change as the evidence base is reviewed. ## High-capacity surveillance states Some democratic states also possess exceptionally powerful intelligence and surveillance systems. The United States and United Kingdom are examples of: - `high_capacity_surveillance_state` They are not placed in Annex A merely because they possess strong surveillance capabilities. Their inclusion in this separate category serves an important purpose: the project should not pretend that surveillance power exists only in authoritarian systems. The policy distinction is based on factors such as: - legal authorization; - judicial oversight; - legislative scrutiny; - independent media; - civil-society oversight; - transparency mechanisms; - meaningful political competition; - practical avenues to challenge abuse. These safeguards are not perfect, and their existence does not make all surveillance legitimate. They do, however, materially distinguish surveillance capacity from a system designed primarily for political repression or population control. ## Restricted jurisdictions The current working restricted-jurisdiction list is maintained separately in: - [Annex A — Elamur Cosmic License and Elamur API Terms](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/LICENSE-ANNEX-A/) The evidence supporting each designation should be maintained separately in: - `EVIDENCE-ANNEX-A.md` The restricted list is intentionally narrower than generic lists of authoritarian or "Not Free" states. A jurisdiction should normally enter Annex A only where there is a serious combination of factors such as: - entrenched authoritarian rule; - systemic political repression; - elimination or persecution of meaningful opposition; - severe censorship; - repression of independent media; - population-scale surveillance used for control; - political imprisonment; - torture; - enforced disappearance; - grave and systematic rights abuses; - aggressive war or occupation where the technology could materially support unlawful state coercion; - security or intelligence structures with documented patterns of abuse. ## Prohibited institutional users The final license should distinguish between nationality and institutional role. Restricted categories should focus on actors such as: - government agencies engaged in political repression; - intelligence services; - domestic security bodies; - military or paramilitary units engaged in prohibited uses; - designated state-controlled corporations; - contractors acting on behalf of prohibited state bodies; - entities building or operating political-surveillance infrastructure. ## Prohibited uses The final legal language should define prohibited conduct as precisely as possible. Working concepts include: - `political_repression` - `mass_surveillance_for_population_control` - `censorship_enforcement` - `persecution_of_dissidents` - `unlawful_targeting` - `torture_or_disappearance_support` - `discriminatory_population_profiling` - `unlawful_military_or_security_use` - `assistance_to_designated_repressive_security_services` These labels are placeholders for formal legal drafting. They should not remain vague moral slogans if they can be converted into concrete definitions. ## Allowed users from restricted jurisdictions Restrictions must not become collective punishment. Examples of users who should remain eligible, subject to the normal license terms: - independent researchers; - students; - journalists; - human-rights defenders; - opposition activists; - dissidents; - civil-society organizations; - ordinary individuals; - independent developers; - private organizations not acting on behalf of a prohibited state body. Examples: - A Chinese student: allowed. - A Belarusian independent journalist: allowed. - An Iranian researcher: allowed. - A Turkmen dissident: allowed. - A Russian independent developer not acting for a prohibited institution: allowed. By contrast: - A state political-surveillance system designed to identify dissidents: prohibited. - A censorship system designed to detect political opposition for punishment: prohibited. - A population-profiling system used to support political repression: prohibited. - A contractor building such a system for a prohibited security body: prohibited. ## Evidence and review Restrictions should be evidence-based and versioned. No jurisdiction should be treated as permanently restricted merely because it once qualified. A country may be removed if conditions materially improve. Relevant changes can include: - restoration of genuine political competition; - release and rehabilitation of political prisoners; - meaningful freedom of independent media; - judicial independence; - dismantling of repressive surveillance infrastructure; - reform of security institutions; - credible accountability for past abuses; - restoration of civil and political rights. Likewise, a jurisdiction outside Annex A may be added if conditions deteriorate. Every evidence entry should eventually include: - status; - date reviewed; - evidence of authoritarian-system characteristics; - evidence of political repression; - evidence of surveillance or censorship; - evidence of torture, disappearance, or other grave abuses where relevant; - evidence relating to war or aggression where relevant; - specific relevance to the Elamur API; - external sources; - next mandatory review date. ## Current policy files Recommended structure: - [Elamur API and Token Terms — working draft](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/API-TERMS/) — short, stable, operative terms for API access and tokens. - `ELAMUR-COSMIC-LICENSE.md` — the license of the free code: open for people, not for Big Brother. - [Annex A — Elamur Cosmic License and Elamur API Terms](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/LICENSE-ANNEX-A/) — restricted jurisdictions and designated institutional categories. - `EVIDENCE-ANNEX-A.md` — country-by-country evidence and citations. - [Not a Big Brother](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/Not-a-Big-Brother/) — this explanatory policy appendix. - [Mythology](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/MYTHOLOGY/) — cultural and satirical framing only; never operative legal text. ## Review notes currently recorded The current working policy includes these review decisions: - Syria — removed from the restricted list for now; review later. - Azerbaijan — removed from the restricted list for now. - Eswatini — not added. - Ethiopia — not added. - Rwanda — not added. - Oman — not added. - Qatar — not added. - Algeria — not added. - Angola — not added. - Cameroon — not added. - Chad — not added. - Niger — explicitly not added. - Gabon — not added. - Togo — not added at this stage. - Uganda — review only. - Kyrgyzstan — review only. - Kazakhstan — authoritarian and surveillance-capable, but not placed in the most severe category during this pass. Uzbekistan and Bahrain remain in Annex A but should be reviewed annually. ## Enforcement The project does not plan to rely on litigation. A party that violates these restrictions loses its API keys and is added to an internal blacklist: no new keys, tokens, contracts, services, data access or custom work. No court finding or formal proof is required for the project to decline to do business with someone. The cultural framing of this policy ("the family settles its own affairs, as in old Chicago") lives in [Mythology](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/MYTHOLOGY/) and is satirical, never operative. ## Final principle The purpose of these restrictions is not to decide which countries are morally pure. The purpose is to draw a practical boundary around dangerous uses of powerful software. The Elamur API should not help a state: - watch an entire population for political obedience; - identify people for punishment because of speech or association; - automate censorship; - turn language analysis into a dissident-detection system; - make political repression cheaper, faster, or more scalable. The project should remain open to people. It should not become infrastructure for a Big Brother. - [← previous Mythology](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/MYTHOLOGY/) - [↑ back to Licence files](https://md.mova.elamur.ai/free/en/docs/licence/)